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COURTS-MARTIAL
DONALD B. CREECY"

There is one fact for every budding critic to bear well in mind
in approaching the system of military law or anything else connected
with the military establishment. Here is a field of necessary activities,
which for many years lay choked and barren by virtue of popular
neglect. Until the advent of war, the Army and the Navy were not
supported by our people; its officers and men were flouted and derided.
and the opinions of the best experts they could produce were kicked
from pillar to post. Therefore, it is well and just that the public stifle
its bitter reproaches, its saeva indignatio, against the services and their
officers, accept its own share of responsibility for their mistakes, and
confine its opinion to a calm estimate of how to better the situation
for the future.
One illustration of just how attentive civil life has been to conditions in the military service, may not be inappropriate. This horrible
example is taken from the House Naval Affairs Committee, where one
might properly expect to find concentrated civil wisdom on service
affairs. The writer had the somewhat qualified pleasure of seeing a
letter from a member of this Committee to a Captain of Marines, a
Company Commander, requesting the immediate discharge of a certain marine and threatening to take up the matter with Secretary
Baker. The Company Commander's reply painfully explained that
the Marine Corps was subject to the control of the Secretary of the
Navy and not the Secretary of War. Incidentally, in order that
another straw may not be unjustly laid on the back of the overburdened administration, it may be stated that the author was a Republican, although it is not claiined that the Republicans have a
monopoly on ignorance.
Approaching the subject of military courts-martial with impartiality between civil and military law, it is possible that the experience
of a civilian lawyer, in the trial of numerous general and summary
courts-martial for over two years, may warrant a few comments and
suggestions. Although the Army courts have borne the brunt of
criticism, the Navy system is essentially the same, and general comments upon the latter necessarily apply to both.
'Lately Captain, U. S. M. C. Member of the Baltimore Bar, Central Savings Bank Building, Baltimore. Md.
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The hue and cry that courts-martial are composed of grim martinets, bristling with importance, to whom the enlisted man is a
shrinking creature to be hunted down and done to death, is an excellent
specimen of the worst rot than can be uttered on the subject. Courtsmartial, on the contrary, are composed in the majority of good fellows
who are considerably bored with the proceedings, have an idea that
they can pick up the proper judgment offhand, and whose strict atttntion is only focused upon any point by considerable effort on the
part of counsel. This is not peculiar to military law. The same phenomenon is frequently exhibited by our judges, as any lawyer well
knows who has seen the judicial eye roving to the clock at all stages
of the proceedings. Then, the habit of prejudging, also not unknown
to civil courts, is common with courts-martial. Almost, as a matter
of course, the members pick up camp gossip on the cases they are
about to try. As an example of snap-judgment, a member of a general court told counsel, after only one witness in a long case testified,
that he thought this witness was a liar and he was going to vote for
acquittal. Such abuses arise simply from the infirmities of human
nature, which consistently renders slip-shod all science and system
that touches it. To a certain extent, these eccentricities would be
obviated by the provision of a trained legal corps for duty on courtsmartial only. But the difficulties are insuperable. The proper judicial
timber could not be obtained to devote itself to trying Pvt. John Jones
for spitting at Sgt. Smith or Cpl. Brown for getting a huge jag out of
a bottle of vanilla extract. The result of establishing a legal corps
would be to get a personnel of half-baked lawyers who would be infinitely worse than the run of fairly practical men who now sit on the
courts. Whatever improvement is possible must be made along the
line of a more thorough legal education of officers, a course impracticable in war times.
The provision of competent counsel for the accused is without
doubt important. The tendency of courts-martial is to consider counsel as more or less of an impertinence, particularly when he takes
issue with a member of the court. The horror with which certain
majors and colonels regard an objection by a lieutenant to their sometimes ridiculous questions, may be readily imagined. Counsel, who
has a little rank or is a lawyer and knows his rights, will not allow
himself to be intimidated in the least. And the consistent assignment
of such counsel only will familiarize court members with the certainty that their dignity will be infringed whenever they interfere
improperly with the defense or otherwise misconduct themselves. A
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necessary amendment to existent courts-martial law is, therefore, a
provision that, upon the request of accused for counsel in a general
court-martial case, the commanding officer shall not detail an officer
below the rank of captain, unless such officer is a graduated and
licensed lawyer. The suggestion that a civilian lawyer be detailed for
every general court is absolutely impractical. First, American civilian
lawyers are not available in many places where troops serve and
courts-martial convene; second, the payment of fees would create a
job-seeking, wire-pulling class or at least the feeling that such a class
existed; third, the civilian frequently rubs a military court the wrong
way by his ignorance of military life, and cannot possibly work as
effectively for the accused as can an officer who knows the members
of the court and is on terms of often intimate friendship with them.
A finding of acquittal by the court should terminate the proceedings: the present right to change to a conviction is really intolerable.
The writer defended the cases of two men, separately arraigned, who
had participated in the same transaction. The specifications were
badly drawn, and the men were not guilty of the offense charged,
although possibly guilty of another minor offense. After considerable
effort, the court acquitted the first man, the finding being, according
to regulations, a profound secret, although, of course, everybody knew
what it was. The second case came on. The accused did not create a
favorable impression, and, although the facts were identical and the
law had not changed in half an hour, the court convicted him. Then,
to make it unanimous, the court went back to the first case, struck out
the acquittal and entered conviction there. This case was stamped
upon my memory by a subsequent letter from the mother of the onceacquitted man, then in the Naval prison, stating that she .was dying
and wanted to see her son. 'The thing to be emphasized is that the
court acted within its rights: the court is not to be blamed, but a
particular feature of the system, for which public indifference to military affairs is largely responsible.
An acquittal may be disapproved and the case sent back for revision by the convening authority. The court theoretically cannot be
compelled to change, its finding, but practically the feature of compulsion is there. The same thing applies to proceedings in revision
looking to a heavier sentence. No one wants to have his actions disapproved by his military superior, particularly if such disapproval may
be accompanied by nasty comment which will injure his military record.
The writer is firmly convinced that the severity of many sentences is
due to the natural, human feeling of courts, that they are only safe
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from criticism if they lay it on thick, in which case the convening
authority can mitigat6 without returning the case for revision. The
opinion that this is the only practicable course to follow under the
system, is so often expressed by experienced officers, and the cases are
so often illustrative of such course, as to offer no escape from this conclusion. As one illustrative case, an officer, who had served many
years without a spot on his record, participated in several expeditions
with honor, distinguishing himself particularly at Vera Cruz, who was
in addition one of the most valuable technical men in the service, was
tried for a casual affair with a woman. The writer does not believe
that a single member of the court thought this man should be dismissed from the service, or that, if their judgment had been free, they
would have considered for a moment a penalty greater than fine and
loss of numbers. But they voted unanimously for dismissal simply
because they knew the extreme opinions of the Secretary of the Navy
on such matters, and that they would only succeed in hanging themselves also if they refused to sacrifice the required victim. Again,
neither are the members to be blamed for having the normal instincts
of self-preservation, nor is the Secretary to be blamed for having
private opinions; but the system, which masks personal views as final
arbiter under the guise of a judicial proceeding, is in that respect a
mockery and a farce. The appropriate remedy for this serious defect
is a provision that a finding of acquittal shall be final, and that proceedings in revision shall not lie to revise a sentence upwards.
The secret finding and sentence is closely akin to the practice of
convicting acquitted men and revising sentences upward. Indeed, that
practice is the only excuse ever offered for secrecy; although the connection is difficult to understand unless the system is ashamed to let
it be known that a man has been first acquitted and then convicted.
In any event, this gum-shoe, hush-hush procdeding should stop. In
the first place, it is a joke. Of course, everybody is solemnly sworn
to secrecy, but everybody also knows that it is a lot of monkey-business
and that strict secrecy is of no practical importance. In consequence,
anybody who has sufficient curiosity, can nine times out of ten get a
hint which discloses what the finding was. If the accused has a previous conviction, which often is the case, no hint is necessary, his record
is read if he is convicted, but not read if he is acquitted. In such cases,
we have therefore the solemn comedy of a court, sworn to secrecy on
its verdict, disclosing by its next act exactly what that verdict is. To
repeat, court-martial secrecy is a joke; but a very bad joke. It casts a
twilight haze over the proceedings, which encourages members to find
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verdicts and impose sentences that they would hegitate considerably
about if they had them to proclaim face to face with accused, counsel
ald spectators. It is unmanly, unfair and archaic, and serves no useful
purpose whatsoever. Both Gen. Crowder and Col. Ansell agree that
convicting acquitted men, revising sentences upward, and secret findings and sentence should be abolished.
A limitation should be imposed upon trying a man at the same
time for all sorts of different offenses. An accused was tried on three
charges: (1) Theft, (2) Unlawful possession, (3) An insubordinate
remark about a sergeant. He was acquitted of the first two charges,
convicted on the third and sentenced to two years. Without the
shadow of a doubt, the court was punishing him .for the theft of which
they had insufficient evidence, but believed him guilty. This system
of heaping up entirely disconnected charges is vicious in the extreme,
and offers an opportunity to convict anybody by raking up all of his
past delinquencies and heaping them upon him. The limitations of
joinder in the Federal Criminal Code permit sufficient latitude to the
prosecution in allowing joinder of acts arising from "the same transaction," "or connected together," or comprising "the same class of
crimes," in the latter case discretion to compel election resting with
the trial court. These provisions ought to be incorporated in the
military law and thus prevent the possibility of trying a man at the
same time for murder in Alaska and chicken-thieving in Texas.
The rigidity of the proceedings and record, the insistence upon the
most trivial matters, is a noticeable feature of the court-martial system. The reformers do not make much of this, apparently because it
favors the accused, and no popular gnashing of teeth can be aroused
over the escape of military offenders on technical grounds. The
charges and specifications are often very badly drawn, indeed the
draughtsmen in the department seem at times to have a positive genius
for charging everything else except what the man is guilty of. This
may be due to misconceptions arising from the papers submitted, the
draughtsmen having no opportunity to interview the witnesses personally. I speak now only of general courts-martial originating in the
department at Washington. In every case, the trial judge advocate
should have more authority and responsibility. If he interviews the
witnesses, he should prepare the charges and specifications and forward them with the statements of the witnesses. Before and at the
trial, he should have the power, subject to the court's approval, to
amend the charges and specifications not merely in trivialities but
in substance, reserving to the accused, if taken by surprise, the
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right df postponement. The idea, that the trial judge advocate and
the court are not competent to do this, is simply *typical of the old
military style which is not satisfied unless it has a colonel doing a
second lieutenant's job. No record should be sent back for revision
except for errors in substance; any inartificial statement that conveys
the appi:opriate meaning should suffice. The writer has seen a case
returned because the sentence was to perform extra "police duty,"
instead of "police duties." This is typical also.
The practice of clearing the court to rule on all objections to evidence is impossible. This unduly protracts the trial. I have known
instances where all participants cooled their heels for over half an
hour outside while the court discussed simple objections, such as
"leading." The resuit is that counsel has to pass up all sorts of improprieties in order to get through at all. The President of the Court
should rule on all objections to evidence, unless other members indicate a desire to participate, and then the discussion should be informal,
unless a majority of the court votes to clear the court room. There is
nothing to prevent this practice being now followed, but it is not and
will not be until some law or regulation makes it mandatory.
In spite of the several glaring defects pointed out in the courtmartial system, the writer's experience is that substantial justice is
done by courts-martial about as well as by civil courts. The army, by
virtue of its stupendous increase and total re-organization, was up
against a much stiffer proposition than the Navy, and its courts-martial
problems were proportionately more difficult to solve. For this reason,
temporary and abnormal conditions may have in some cases produced
abnormal results. But the wholesale indictments, the frothing and
raving, the appeals to popular prejudices about martinets and Prussian
militarism and all such buncombe, with which the reform agitation has
been accompanied, cannot be regarded properly as 'other than barren
and disgraceful. This arouses the same ignorant prejudices that have
killed any attempt to improve the military establishment in the past,
and by catering to such influences makes a pretty poor start towards
improving it in the future. The defects in the system are plain, and
most of them easily identified. Bills to remedy them were before
Congress in the early part of last session, and, if Congress had attended
to its business, they would have been passed before the court-martial
fanfare started. Thinking men do the country a great disservice when
they encourage Congress in its preference for investigation and raving
and its dislike of work.

